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CORRESPONDENCE 
Conditional Probative Value 
and the Reconstruction of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence 
Dale A. Nance* 
In a recent article, Richard Friedman articulates a modified and 
generalized version of the doctrine of conditional relevance, which 
he calls "conditional probative value."1 This version comes in re-
sponse to a substantial body of academic criticism of the traditional 
doctrine.2 As one of the critics to whom Professor Friedman re-
sponds, I offer this reply with two purposes in mind: (1) to clarify 
the relationship between Friedman's analysis and my earlier rein-
terpretation of the conditional relevance doctrine; and (2) to ad-
dress Friedman's specific proposals with regard to the Federal 
Rules of Evidence. I conclude that Friedman's articulation helps 
clarify the logic of proof in certain contexts, but I take issue with his 
suggestions for amending the Federal Rules. 
I. THE TRADITIONAL DocrRINE AND ITs CR.mcisM 
The doctrine of conditional relevance has become an integral 
part of evidence law, especially since the passage of the Federal 
Rules in 1975. The principal codification of the doctrine is the 
following: 
{Federal Rules of Evidence} Rule 104(b). Relevancy conditioned on 
fact. When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of 
a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the 
introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfill-
ment of the condition. 
* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. B.A. 
1974, Rice; J.D. 1977, Stanford; M.A. (Jurisprudence & Social Policy) 1981, U.C. Berkeley. 
- Ed. I wish to thank Richard Friedman for his insightful comments on a draft of this paper. 
1. See Richard D. Friedman, Conditional Probative Value: Neoclassicism Without Myth, 
93 MICH. L. REv. 439 (1994). 
2. See 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIAtS AT COMMON LAW § 14.1 (Ttllers 
rev. ed. 1983); Ronald J. Allen, The Myth of Conditional Relevancy, 25 LoY. L.A. L. RE.v. 
871 (1992); Vaughn C. Ball, The Myth of Conditional Relevancy, 14 GA. L. REv. 435 (1980); 
Dale A. Nance, Conditional Relevance Reinterpreted, 70 B.U. L. REv. 447 (1990). 
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In addition, the Rules employ the "sufficient to support a finding" 
standard for preliminary fact determinations with regard to the per-
sonal knowledge and authentication requirements.3 The Advisory 
Committee's notes inform us that these latter requirements are in 
fact based on the notion of conditional relevance.4 
The problem that modem critics of this doctrine emphasize is 
that it reflects a defective conceptualization of probabilistic inf er-
ence. It would be quite an unusual coincidence if evidence of prop-
osition X were relevant only when the probability of some other 
proposition Y is greater than the probability of the proposition Not-
Y. In most cases, including those by which the doctrine of condi-
tional relevance has been explained, the evidence of proposition X 
is relevant as long as the probability of proposition Y is not zero. 
For example, when it is said that the relevance of Hector's shouting 
a warning to Penelope is conditional upon her having heard the 
shout, this statement can only be a very misleading way of saying 
that the evidence of the shout is relevant as long as we are not cer-
tain that it was not heard. But this is decidedly different from the 
conventional understanding of Rule 104(b ), which requires evi-
dence sufficient to support a "finding" that the shout was heard.5 
Some of the critics have argued that the only appropriate re-
sponse to this dilemma is to eliminate the doctrine entirely.6 Under 
this approach, there is no special procedure for determining issues 
of conditional relevance. When a question of relevance is raised by 
an objection, the issue for the trial judge to decide is simply 
whether a reasonable trier of fact could find the offered evidence 
relevant.7 Thus, in response to a relevance objection against evi-
3. See FED. R. Evm. 602 (requiring evidence sufficient to support a finding that a witness 
has personal knowledge of the matters of her proposed testimony); FED. R. Evm. 901(a) 
(requiring evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its 
proponent claims). 
4. See FED. R. Evm. 602 advisory committee's note (describing the personal knowledge 
requirement as a "specialized application of the provisions ••. on conditional relevancy"); 
FED. R. Evm. 901(a) advisory committee's note (describing the authentication or identifica-
tion requirement as falling "in the category of relevancy dependent upon fulfillment of a 
condition of fact"). 
5. See, e.g., Nance, supra note 2, at 450-56 (elaborating on the analysis of cases like that 
of Penelope and other cases that have been claimed to involve conditional relevance). Pro-
fessor Friedman agrees, for the most part, with these criticisms. See Friedman, supra note 1, 
at 441-45. 
6. This solution is pressed most strongly in Ball, supra note 2, and Allen, supra note 2. 
7. This interpretation is the one usually given for the requirement of relevance, although 
deference to the potential judgment of the trier of fact cannot be read directly from the 
Federal Rules. Compare FED. R. Evm. 402 (excluding evidence that is irrelevant, without 
specifying what is to be done in the event that the trial judge thinks the evidence is irrelevant 
but also believes that a reasonable juror could think it relevant) with United States v. Wil-
liams, 545 F.2d 47, 50 (8th Cir. 1976) (endorsing the standard more deferential to the jury). 
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dence of Hector's shout, the trial judge should simply consider 
whether, under the state of the admitted evidence, the evidence of 
the shout could reasonably make the fact of notice to Penelope 
more likely than it would be without that evidence. 
Of course, if, in the end, there is insufficient evidence to support 
a finding that Penelope had knowledge of the danger described in 
the shout and if that knowledge is itself an ultimate fact to be 
proved in the case, then the trial judge would be warranted in di-
recting a verdict for Penelope on that issue, be it an issue of contrib-
utory negligence, assumption of the risk, or whatever. Still, it is 
important to keep in mind that such knowledge could come from 
some source other than Hector's shout. A "sufficient to support a 
finding" standard, like that prescribed in the current Rule 104(b ), is 
simply misplaced as an admissibility rule.8 
These arguments are convincing. But do they capture all that 
there is to say about conditional relevance? 
II. NANCE'S REINTERPRETATION OF THE DOCTRINE 
In my principal contribution to this subject, I went back to pri-
mary sources in order to find out how - and indeed whether -
those authorities made the conceptual mistakes the modem critics 
identify.9 I discovered that most of the reported decisions that have 
been used to explain and justify the doctrine of conditional rele-
Friedman explicitly endorses the deferential standard as correct for ordinary judicial judg-
ments of relevance. See Friedman, supra note 1, at 459 (extending the deferential standard to 
any admissibility decision in which the court must estimate probative value). Professor Allen 
proposes to formalize this deference to the trier of fact by amending Rule 104(b) to read as 
follows: 
{Allen's proposed} Rule 104(b). Relevancy. The court shall admit evidence over a rele-
vancy objection upon, or subject to, a finding that the evidence could rationally influence 
a reasonable person's assessment of any fact that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action. 
Allen, supra note 2, at 883-84. There is, however, another approach, one that is more consis-
tent with the framing of other provisions in the Federal Rules in avoiding the necessity of a 
special exception to Rule 104(a). See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 602, 901(a), 1008. One could sim-
ply reword Rule 402 on relevance as follows: 
{Nance's proposed} Rule 402. Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant Evi-
dence Inadmissible. All evidence that a reasonable person could consider relevant is 
admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by 
Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court 
pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence that a reasonable person could not consider 
relevant is inadmissible. 
Later, however, I suggest a very different substitution for Rule 104(b). See infra Part IV. 
8. The conflation of admissibility and sufficiency issues is a principal theme in the criti-
cism of conditional relevance. See, e.g., Nance, supra note 2, at 451, 453-54, 457-62. Here 
again, Professor Friedman agrees with the critics, arguing that the "sufficient to support a 
finding" language artificially interferes with the trier of fact's ability to evaluate complex 
inferences. See Friedman, supra note 1, at 447-53. 
9. See Nance, supra note 2, passim. 
422 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:419 
vance, in fact, illustrate something entirely different. In particular, 
many reflect the broader policy of assuring an optimal trade-off be-
tween the goal of having all relevant and available evidence before 
the tribunal and that of avoiding a waste of resources - including 
the parties' resources - in the consideration of the evidence.10 In 
the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, this trade-off 
was achieved under the rubric of the "best evidence" principle. 
This principle, as I have elaborated it in a series of articles, imposes 
on each litigant a duty to present the most probative evidence rea-
sonably available to the litigant, except to the extent that (a) to do 
so would be a waste of resources, or (b) an opponent has a reason-
able opportunity to present evidence omitted by the litigant.11 
Applying this notion to the purported conditional relevance 
cases, I argued that some of the decisions represent nothing more 
controversial than the exclusion of undeniably relevant evidence 
because the consumption of time and energy entailed by its consid-
eration outweighs its weak probative value, at least without further 
supporting evidence. For example, evidence of Hector's shout, 
though undeniably and unconditionally relevant, could be excluded 
nonetheless if the circumstances indicate a very low probability that 
the shout was heard. This kind of exclusion represents what I have 
called the contractionary dimension of the best evidence principle.12 
On the other hand, some cases instantiate an expansionary di-
mension of that principle, the idea that exclusion of the proffered 
evidence is used as an inducement or reminder to present further 
probative evidence affecting the inferences drawn and probably 
available to the proponent of the challenged evidence. This kind of 
application of the principle is more controversial, primarily because 
of arguments that can be made concerning the adversarial privilege 
indicated in the qualification (b) to the duty articulated above. 
Nonetheless, there will be cases in which the cost-benefit analysis 
suggests that the burden to present the additional evidence should 
be placed upon the proponent of the challenged evidence rather 
than left to an adversarial response.13 For example, evidence of 
Hector's shout might be excluded if there is significant doubt both 
about whether Penelope heard the shout and whether the propo-
10. See id. at 466-83. 
11. The principle is most fully developed in Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 
73 IowA L. REv. 227 (1988). See also Dale A. Nance, Missing Evidence, 13 CARDOZO L. 
REv. 831 (1991); Dale A Nance, Understanding Responses to Hearsay: An Extension of the 
Comparative Analysis, 16 Mnm. L. REv. 459 (1992). 
12. See Nance, supra note 2, at 474-75. 
13. See id. at 472-74. 
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nent of the evidence has reasonable and superior access to addi-
tional potential evidence that would help resolve that doubt.14 
Finally, and importantly, I argued that some cases used to justify 
the conditional relevance doctrine cannot be explained by either a 
contractionary or expansionary application of the best evidence 
principle or by any other convincing policy or principle. I con-
cluded that these decisions were simply mistaken rulings that the 
defective logic of conditional relevance cannot vindicate.is Thus, I 
argued that courts should reinterpret the conditional relevance doc-
trine to eliminate these mistakes without rejecting those decisions 
that can be justified by appropriate applications of the best evi-
dence principle or by some other policy or principle distinct from 
the notion of conditional relevance.16 
Ill. FRIEDMAN'S RECONSTRUCTION OF THE DOCTRINE 
Professor Friedman offers to reconstruct the traditional doctrine 
by shifting the focus from the binary, all-or-nothing concept of rele-
vance to the more variable concept of probative value. The result-
ing concept of "conditional probative value" is not limited to the 
relatively small number of situations in which the relevance of evi-
dence can truly be said to be conditional upon the introduction of 
other evidence.17 Indeed, the probative value of every piece of evi-
dence is conditional upon other evidence. But if so, what utility is 
obtained from this shift of focus? In particular, what pragmatic 
consequences follow from identifying an issue of conditional proba-
tive value? 
Note that the traditional doctrine directly implicates an admissi-
bility rule: if evidence of X is relevant only upon the introduction 
of some evidence of Y or - as the traditional doctrine lamely put it 
14. See id. at 466-71 (discussing the similar treatment of this issue in the leading case of 
Gila Valley, Globe & N. Ry. v. Hall, 232 U.S. 94 (1914)). 
15. See id. at 459-62, 493. Some of these mistakes are probably attributable, at least in 
part, to the incorporation of the defective conventional logic into authoritative norms like 
Rule 104(b). See id. at 471-72. 
16. Consequently, Professor Allen's characterization of my article as an attempt to "de-
fend the status quo" is misleading. See Allen, supra note 2, at 871-72. Although I did suggest 
how courts can interpret the existing Federal Rules to achieve maximal possible coherence 
with the best evidence principle, I did not argue that those Rules are now optimally worded 
nor did I argue that courts have consistently interpreted them according to my suggestions. 
See Nance, supra note 2, at 492-505. My article was more the basis of reinterpretation and 
reform than a defense of the status quo. 
17. Friedman amplifies and at times corrects the concessions by earlier critics that there 
are indeed some cases in which the relevance of evidence is conditional upon the presence of 
other evidence. Compare Nance, supra note 2, at 456 n.30, 474 n.114 and accompanying text 
with Friedman, supra note 1, at 443. 
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- upon the introduction of evidence "sufficient to support a find-
ing" of Y, then a fortiori the evidence of X should be excluded un-
less or until the required evidence of Y is introduced. This result 
follows immediately from the rule excluding irrelevant evidence. 
Indeed, the conditional relevance doctrine has been conceived as 
simply stating an implication of that rule.is By contrast, the fact 
that evidence of X possesses probative value that is conditional on 
evidence of Y does not by itself determine the application of any 
rule or principle of exclusion; exclusion is warranted only by refer-
ence to a rule or principle that cannot be inferred directly from the 
conditional character of the probative value.19 
Where, then, is the exclusionary bite of Friedman's reconstruc-
tion? Here, unfortunately, there is a considerable ambiguity in his 
article. Tue most plausible understanding of the answer he gives to 
this question is this: sometimes, when the probative value of evi-
dence A is conditional on evidence B, the presence or absence of 
evidence B will determine whether or not evidence A is admissible 
under rules excluding relevant evidence because its probative value 
is outweighed by the waste of time and other resources necessary to 
consider it. In other words, the admission of B will put A over the 
threshold between de minimis evidence and significant evidence. 
He even gives this situation a special name, "near-absolute condi-
tional probative value."20 If this is the tack that Friedman intends 
to take, then the implicated exclusionary rationale is just the con-
tractionary dimension of the best evidence principle I described 
earlier. To this extent, Friedman's reconstruction amounts to an 
elaboration of the implications of that contractionary principle, 
18. It should be added, however, that the goal of the conventional fonnulation was actu-
ally to weaken the exclusionary force of the relevance rule compared to what some earlier 
courts had done with it. See Nance, supra note 2, at 454-55 {discussing Edmund Morgan's 
efforts to relax the restrictions on admissibility some courts imposed under the rubric of 
relevance detenninations). 
19. In Penelope's case, for example, the fact that there exists other evidence conditioning 
the probative value of the evidence of Hector's shout does not, by itself, warrant exclusion of 
the latter. Suppose the court has reason to believe that Romulus, not before the court, wit-
nessed the shout. Then the probative value of the proffered evidence of the shout is condi-
tional on the testimony of Romulus. But that, by itself, is not enough to warrant exclusion or 
else virtually all evidence would be subject to similar exclusion unless and until all other 
potential evidence, otherwise admissible on the same material issue, is admitted. To warrant 
exclusion, one must advert to something else, such as (a) the fact, if true, that consideration 
of the evidence of the shout would waste too much time or {b) the fact, if true, that the 
testimony of Romulus is reasonably available for presentation by the proponent but not by 
the opponent. 
20. See Friedman, supra note 1, at 458. Thus, his principal reconstruction of the doctrine 
of conditional relevance, as an admissibility rule, is a doctrine of near-absolute conditional 
probative value. 
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though he does not describe it as such.21 Friedman offers a series of 
nicely constructed hypotheticals that illustrate the common prob-
lem of technically relevant evidence that has de minimis probative 
value until further evidence is received.22 
On the other hand, Friedman's concept of ne~-absolute condi-
tional probative value is susceptible to a broader interpretation. 
Friedman could mean this concept to apply in any situation in 
which some conditioning evidence, B, augments the probative value 
of the initial evidence, A, enough to overcome some rule that would 
otherwise operate to exclude the latter. In this situation, A and B 
would have near-absolute conditional probative value relative to the 
rule in question. The implicated admissibility rule would not be 
limited then to that which excludes evidence as a waste of time or 
other resources. Moreover, this broader notion could apply even if 
A without B has high probative value, as when very probative evi-
dence is inadmissible, without more, because of its extremely preju-
dicial potential. This interpretation of Friedman's argument is 
rather difficult to square with his explicit definitions of near-
absolute probative value, which refer to A as having "very little" or 
"insignificant" probative value without B, and this is especially so in 
the context of the examples that motivate his definition.23 None-
theless, if this broader meaning is the one intended, then the con-
21. Friedman, however, does cite as analogous my discussion of the contractionary di-
mension. See id. at 445 n.22. 
22. See id. at 444-45, 450-51, 454-55, 461-63. 
23. The examples Friedman uses to motivate the concept of near-absolute conditional 
probative value refer to the initial evidence as having very low probative value without the 
conditioning evidence, with no countervailing factor in play except the obvious resource con-
servation factor. See id. at 444 (exemplifying evidence with probative value "too minuscule 
to warrant admissibility"). Friedman's definitional passage then reads as follows: 
I will use the term near-absolute conditional probative value to describe this special case, 
because the essence of it is that not only does the proffered evidence have greater proba-
tive value given the predicate than absent the predicate, but absent the predicate the 
proffered evidence has very little probative value at all, too little to warrant admissibil-
ity. In other words, evidence of A has significant probative value with respect to propo-
sition X conditional on B in this narrower sense if (i) A does not have significant 
probative value with respect to X if B is not included in the base of information, but (ii) 
A does have significant probative value with respect to X if B is included. 
Id. at 458. To read these definitions as describing the broader version of the concept ex-
plained in the text entails some counterintuitive understanding of the language used. For 
example, in the case of the first definition, it would require one to read the words "too little 
to warrant admissibility" as refining and in fact altering the meaning of the phrase "very little 
probative value at all" or perhaps providing a disjunctive alternative to that phrase; indeed, 
the phrase "very little probative value" would then be mere surplusage, having no independ-
ent content in a definition that seems to be very carefully worded. A conjunctive reading, to 
the effect that A must have very little probative value and indeed too little to warrant admis-
sibility, is the more natural and obvious one. Similarly, in the second definition, it would be 
odd to say that evidence that is very probative but excluded because also extremely prejudi-
cial is evidence that lacks "significant probative value." Of course, it is true that "signifi-
cance" is always relative to something, but his discussion up to this point in the paper and in 
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ceptual connection between Friedman's near-absolute conditional 
probative value and the best evidence principle is severed. The 
concept of near-absolute conditional probative value can then be 
employed in connection with any exclusionary rule, however 
grounded, wise or unwise, so long as its application depends upon a 
weighing of the probative value of A. 24 
To be sure, the analysis is very helpful under either interpreta-
tion. Most obviously, it helps to clarify the relationship between 
the conditional quality of probative value assessments and the pre-
vailing exclusionary rules. For example, Friedman applies his anal-
ysis in a useful critique of the Supreme Court's employment of 
conditional relevance in the context of prior offense evidence in the 
well known Huddleston case, the reasoning in which is defective 
under either reconstruction of that doctrine.25 Peter Tillers, in a 
comment on Professor Friedman's piece, has articulated well the 
benefits derived from attention to the logic of proof provided by 
commentators like Friedman, benefits that in fact go well beyond 
the subject of admissibility rules.26 
Moreover, by recourse to the more general idea of conditional 
probative value, not limited to cases of near-absolute conditional 
probative value, Friedman explicitly articulates a connection be-
tween the expansionary dimension of the best evidence principle 
and the issue of inducing parties to present additional valuable evi-
dence by excluding evidence with undeniably significant probative 
value. To be sure, Professor Friedman devotes relatively little at-
most of what follows does not suggest anything relative to which the probative value of A 
would be insignificant except the obvious factor of the time and expense of its consideration. 
24. Based on Professor Friedman's article, the first interpretation is so much better than 
the second that, in the original draft of my paper, I had largely discounted the latter. The 
broader interpretation is implicated only later in his article, in connection with two examples 
that seem directed at other issues. See id. at 464-66 (using the hypothetical "Akers" case to 
show that, by presenting evidence B, the opponent can "open the door" to the proponent's 
introduction of evidence A, where A would otherwise be excluded under rules barring the 
use of excessively prejudicial evidence); id. at 466-70 (using an actual decision involving po-
tentially prejudicial evidence to illustrate the allocation of responsibility for decisionmaking 
between the judge and jury). These examples employ an idea that could be intended as 
identical to or as simply analogous to that of near-absolute conditional probative value; 
Friedman does not clearly indicate which. Based on a personal communication from Profes-
sor Friedman in regard to my draft, however, I now believe that indeed he did intend the 
broader interpretation of near-absolute conditional probative value. Electronic Mail from 
Richard D. Friedman, Professor of Law, University of Michigan (July 12, 1995) (on file with 
author). Consequently, I have incorporated discussion of it in the text. 
25. See Friedman, supra note 1, at 467-70 (discussing Huddleston v. United States, 485 
U.S. 681 (1988)); cf. Nance, supra note 2, at 498-505 (articulating a similar critique of 
Huddleston). 
26. See Peter Tillers, Exaggerated and Misleading Reports of the Death of Conditional 
Relevance, 93 MICH. L. REV. 478 (1994). 
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tention to this dimension of the best evidence principle. Whereas I 
had offered it as one unifying theme cutting across many so-called 
conditional relevance cases, he limits his endorsement of the idea to 
a special category of problems, those that run under the rubric of 
"authentication."27 Understandably, this emphasis raises the fol-
lowing difficult question: Why should the endorsement be limited 
to authentication problems? I return to this issue in Part VII. 
In the next four Parts, I raise specific objections to what I gener-
ally consider a solid contribution by Professor Friedman to the liter-
ature on relevance and probative .value. The issues I raise do not 
concern the analytical phenomenon of conditional probative value, 
which I think is clearly articulated in his article, despite the ambigu-
ity noted earlier. Rather, they concern the operationalization of 
these ideas in his proposed amendments to the rules of admissibil-
ity. To this subject, Friedman devotes considerably less space. But 
in the details of specific proposals often lies much that is very im-
portant, both practically and theoretically. 
IV. CoNDmoNAL PROBATIVE VALUE AND 
CONDITIONAL ADMISSIBILITY 
The first specific proposal that Professor Friedman makes is, of 
course, to reword Rule 104(b ). Because he agrees with most of the 
earlier criticism of the notion of conditional relevance, he proposes 
to substitute a conditional probative value rule: • 
{Friedman's proposed} Rule 104(b): Probative value conditional on 
further evidence. When a proffered item of evidence has insufficient 
probative value to warrant admissibility on the current state of the 
evidence but would have sufficient probative value to warrant admis-
sibility on some other evidentiary states, the court may in its discre-
tion admit the evidence subject to the introduction of evidence to 
achieve such another evidentiary state.28 
This proposal is a considerable improvement over the current Rule 
104(b ). Although judges can make mistakes in the application of 
any rule, at least Friedman's proposed wording does not invite the 
kind of mistakes that the current rule does. 
The problem with the proposal is simply that it is not as genera-
lized as it should be. In order to see why this is so, consider four 
hypothetical problems. 
27. See Friedman, supra note 1, at 451-53, 470-72. To this extent, his treatment of authen-
tication closely parallels that for which I had earlier argued. See Nance, supra note 2, at 484-
88, 490-97. 
28. Friedman, supra note 1, at 473. 
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Example #1: A litigant offers evidence A. The trial court rules it 
inadmissible under that portion of Rule 403 that grants authority to 
exclude evidence the probative value of which is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of wasting time. The litigant then offers to 
introduce evidence B if necessary to gain admission of A, and the trial 
court indicates that, when coupled with B, A would have sufficient 
probative value as not to be excludable as a waste of time under Rule 
403. 
This example would constitute the paradigmatic application of 
Friedman's proposed Rule 104(b ).29 But consider the following 
hypothetical: 
Example #2: The litigant offers evidence A. Despite the fact, ac-
knowledged by all, that A has significant, indeed high probative value, 
the trial court rules it inadmissible under that portion of Rule 403 that 
grants authority to exclude evidence the probative value of which is 
substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. The litigant 
then offers to introduce evidence B if necessary to gain admission of 
A, and the trial court indicates that, when coupled with B, A will have 
sufficient probative value as not to be substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice. 
Would Professor Friedman consider this a case for the application 
of his Rule 104(b )? A "plain meaning" approach to his rule would 
embrace this situation as well.30 Yet the ambiguity already noted 
concerning Friedman's concept of near-absolute conditional proba-
tive value, upon which his Rule 104(b) is apparently built, casts 
doubt on whether he should be understood as intending this out-
come.31 If the rule extends only to cases that the narrower interpre-
tation of that concept covers, it does not apply to Example #2, since 
a crucial feature of Example #2 is that, by hypothesis, the probative 
value of A is significant even without B. On the other hand, Fried-
man does not explicitly limit his proposed rule to contexts of near-
absolute conditional probative value, and there is no reason not to 
extend the kind of treatment specified in his proposal to evidence 
the admissibility of which is dependent on a weighing of probative 
29. At various places, Professor Friedman notes that the principal provision of the Fed- • 
era! Rules that would exclude evidence of near-absolute conditional probative value is Rule 
403. See id. at 444 n.21, 469. 
30. That is probably the approach we could expect the federal courts to take. See Edward 
R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen Years - The 
Effect of "Plain Meaning" Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory Committee on the Rules of 
Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857 
(1992); Randolph N. Jonakait, The Supreme Court, Plain Meaning, and the Changed Rules of 
Evidence, 68 TEXAS L. REV. 745 (1990). 
31. The context suggests that Friedman considers his proposed rule to be an operational· 
ization of his notion of near-absolute conditional probative value. See Friedman, supra note 
1, at 458 (indicating that, for the most part, near-absolute conditional probative value is the 
pertinent concept in his paper). 
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value against considerations other than merely wasting resources. 
Moreover, if the broader interpretation noted in the previous sec-
tion is given to the meaning of near-absolute conditional probative 
value, then the applicability of Friedman's proposed rule can be 
viewed as intended. 
In any event, what this point illustrates is the fact that Fried-
man's proposal for Rule 104(b) is essentially a proposed wording of 
the traditional procedural doctrine of "linking up," also called "con-
necting up" or, more formally, "conditional admissibility." Indeed, 
Friedman notes the relation between his proposal and that doc-
trine. 32 There is no explicit provision for this idea in the Federal 
Rules, except of course the present Rule 104(b ), and it would not 
be a bad idea to make more explicit the authority to condition ad-
mission in this way.33 But if we are to do so, we should at least 
make sure that we have stated the authorization correctly. Fried-
man's proposal does not quite accomplish this purpose. 
The problem can be seen by considering the next hypothetical: 
Example #3: A plaintiff offers evidence A directed at showing the 
opponent's wealth in a case in which punitive damages are at issue. 
While the defendant's wealth is material, and evidence A is undenia-
bly probative of defendant's wealth, the trial court rules it inadmissi-
ble under Rule 403 because such evidence is too prejudicial to be 
admitted unless a prima facie case of malicious conduct is established. 
The litigant then offers to introduce evidence B to show malice in the 
defendant's conduct, and the trial court indicates that when coupled 
with B, A would be admissible because the risk of prejudice is now 
unavoidable. 
This example is another plausible candidate for the "linking up" 
procedure, but it is not one in which admissibility is achieved by 
introducing additional evidence that increases the probative value 
of the conditioned evidence. There are surely many other such ex-
amples.34 Friedman's proposed Rule 104(b) does not cover such a 
case because it provides only for such a procedure when the effect 
of evidence B is to augment the probative value of A. 35 True, Fried-
32. See id. at 467 (stating that his proposed rule "addresses only the situation in which the 
concept of conditional probative value may be brought into play in an operationally signifi-
cant way"). 
33. Despite the narrowness of Rule 104(b), the courts have managed to employ such 
conditional admission in many contexts not involving only relevance issues. See 1 McCOR-
MICK ON EVIDENCE § 58, at 233 n.10 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) (citing the dis-
cretion granted under Rule 611(a) to control "the mode and order of interrogating witnesses 
and presenting evidence"). 
34. One is mentioned in Nance, supra note 2, at 463-64 (explaining how such conditional 
admissibility does not involve conditional relevance despite assertions that it does). 
35. This is true even if we take the proposed Rule 104(b) as restating the broader inter-
pretation of near-absolute conditional probative value. 
430 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:419 
man's rule does not explicitly require that the connecting evidence 
B increase the probative value of A in order to activate his pro-
posed rule. Literally read, the proposal thus could be said to cover 
a case in which the only effect of B is to reduce the unfairness of the 
prejudice that is weighed against A's unchanged probative value. 
But that is clearly not the most obvious reading of the proposal, at 
least not in the context of an article that consistently speaks to the 
effect of B on the probative value of A. In any event, if the pro-
posed rule is to cover Example #3, then that rule cannot be based 
on the phenomenon of conditional probative value as such. 
Moreover, the proposed rule would have to be stretched beyond 
the breaking point in order to cover the conditional admissibility of 
otherwise privileged or incompetent evidence where neither the 
probative value of the challenged evidence nor the effect thereon of 
the conditioning evidence would be at issue. Consider: 
Example #4: A plaintiff offers evidence A, a statement made by the 
defendant to Witness. The defendant objects to the testimony on the 
ground that the marital communication privilege covers the statement 
to Witness. The plaintiff asserts that the defendant was not in fact 
married to Witness at the time the statement was made and offers to 
show this by documentary evidence B, indicating the date of the mar-
riage. After considering what the defendant has to say in response to 
the objection, the trial judge agrees that if the plaintiff can present the 
indicated documentary evidence, then Witness will be allowed to tes-
tify to the statement. 
In understanding the application of Friedman's proposed rule to 
this example, two points are crucial. First, the probative value of 
the statement is not affected in any way by information about 
whether or not the two were in fact married when it was uttered or 
so we may assume hypothetically. In this respect, Example #4 is 
like Example #3. Second, unlike Example #3, the decision whether 
to admit the testimony does not even involve weighing the proba-
tive value of A against some other consideration; the very premise 
of Friedman's rule thus fails to apply because the reason to exclude 
A without B has nothing to do with its lack of probative value. 
Rather, the admissibility of A depends on the introduction of evi-
dence B that will yield a finding that the privilege did not attach to 
the statement, regardless of the statement's probative value. It is 
perfectly plausible that circumstances could warrant a conditional 
admission of Witness's testimony, if, for example, the plaintiff gives 
appropriate assurances that the indicated documentary evidence 
will be forthcoming, the defendant has nothing to say in reply, and 
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the inconvenience to Witness precludes recalling her at a later date. 
If Friedman's proposal is intended to cover a case like this, it should 
be rewritten. Its references to probative value are entirely 
misleading.36 
So as far as it goes, Friedman's proposal should be expanded to 
the more general case of conditional admissibility. I propose a 
somewhat different replacement for the current Rule 104(b ): 
{Nance's proposed} Rule 104(b). Conditional admissibility. When a 
proffered item of evidence is inadmissible but would be admissible on 
some other state of the evidence, the court may admit the proffered 
evidence subject to the subsequent presentation of evidence sufficient 
to achieve such other evidentiary state. If the court does not condi-
tionally admit the proffered evidence and further evidence is subse-
quently presented that achieves such other evidentiary state, the court 
may not exclude such further evidence on the ground that it is inad-
missible without other evidence if admission of the original proffer 
would have rendered the further evidence admissible. 
This broader rule covers the cases of concern to Professor Friedman 
and also all other cases where such a procedure would be appropri-
ate. By referring to the presentation of further evidence, as distinct 
from its introduction, this proposal covers situations in which the 
conditioning evidence is not technically admissible; in most such 
cases, the judge may nonetheless consider it in determining whether 
the condition on the admissibility of the original evidence has been 
satisfied.37 
The scope of the authorized discretion is essentially limited to 
deciding whether satisfactory representations have been made by 
the proponent in order to warrant conditional admission. In partic-
ular, the second sentence helps to give more precise definition to 
the discretion accorded the trial judge by foreclosing the alterna-
tive, formally allowed by Professor Friedman's version, of rejecting 
evidence A because of the absence of B and then rejecting B be-
36. Although the point is somewhat more subtle, most competency rules will involve a 
similar problem. Consider a preliminary factual issue determining the applicability of a hear-
say exception. Although many, but certainly not all, hearsay exceptions are crafted so that 
satisfying the conditions of the exception augments the probative value of the hearsay evi-
dence, the preliminary decision itself rarely calls for the trial court to weigh the probative 
value explicitly. Thus, it is hard to imagine that Friedman's proposed rule would be con-
strued as applicable. 
37. See FED. R. Evm. 104(a) (prescribing that, in making determinations of admissibility, 
the trial judge is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges). 
In the context of Example #4, suppose the documentary proof of the date of the marriage 
does not qualify under an exception to the hearsay rule; the judge could still use it in deciding 
whether the marital privilege applies. Exceptions to the proposition that unprivileged but 
inadmissible evidence may be considered in deciding admissibility will be noted in the next 
section. See infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text. 
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cause of the absence of A. Theoretically, this result could happen 
in a case in which B suffers from the same problem as A. Although 
such an application of his rule would probably be called an abuse of 
discretion by a reviewing court, it would not hurt to resolve the 
issue because the practical necessity of introducing either A or B 
first is one of the reasons for allowing the procedure in the first 
place.38 
In a sense, it is inevitable that Friedman's proposal should be 
generalized to such a conditional admissibility rule. If evidence A 
has near-absolute conditional probative value, under either inter-
pretation of what that means, then it necessarily follows that A 
should be excluded as of too little probative value to warrant con-
sideration, unless of course B has already been introduced. This 
statement is true whether or not one can identify potential evidence 
B in conjunction with which A would have significant probative 
value.39 All that identifying some such evidence B does, besides 
adverting to the possibility of introducing A after B is introduced, is 
present the proponent with the opportunity to try to invoke the 
court's discretion to allow the proponent to introduce A now and 
"connect up" with B at a later time. The admissibility function is 
exhausted, so to speak, by a combination of the exclusionary rule 
for insufficiently probative evidence and a rule of conditional ad-
missibility, neither of which depends necessarily on the concept of 
conditional probative value. 
V. PRELIMINARY DETERMINATIONS 
As an adjunct to his proposal for Rule 104(b ), Professor Fried-
man recommends the following changes to Rule 104(a), with italics 
indicating material to be added and [brackets] indicating material 
to be deleted: 
{Friedman's proposed amendment to} Rule 104(a). Questions of ad-
missibility generally. Preliminary questions concerning the qualifica-
tion of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the 
admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court[, subject to 
the provisions of subdivision (b)]. In making its determination it is 
38. See 1 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 14; 6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS 
AT COMMON LAW § 1871 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976). 
39. Friedman's formal definitions of near-absolute conditional probative value make this 
clear. In terms broad enough to cover both interpretations given to that concept, the defini-
tions have two requirements: (1) that A have insufficient probative value for admission by 
itself; and (2) that A have sufficient probative value for admission when coupled with some 
B. See Friedman, supra note 1, at 458. The first requirement, which, by itself, activates an 
exclusionary rule, is independent of any identification of potential evidence B or its 
characteristics. 
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not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privi-
lege. That the probative value of proffered evidence is conditional on 
the truth of a given proposition is not a ground on which the truth or 
falsity of that proposition shall be deemed a preliminary question 
within the meaning of this rule. 40 
The proposed deletion is correct given either his or my change in 
Rule 104(b ). Friedman's explanation of the proposed additional 
language is that it is intended to emphasize that his new Rule 
104(b) is not a qualification of Rule 104(a), but rather a provision 
of a substantially different type.41 I agree with the logical status of 
the new Rule 104(b ), whether his version or mine. Actually, if my 
version were adopted, the relationship to Rule 104(a) would be so 
much more obvious that no accentuation in Rule 104(a) would be 
necessary. 
There is a more subtle problem, however, one that lies in the 
nature of the directive that Friedman has added. That directive is 
not an exclusionary rule nor an exception to such a rule, and it is 
not an otherwise unstated rule about how to apply other exclusion-
ary rules. Rather, it is an analytically correct directive warning 
practitioners not to make a particular conceptual error in applying 
the exclusionary rules. It is, moreover, a directive that is already 
implied by the other rules because no other rule makes the admissi-
bility of evidence turn on the mere fact that the probative value of 
the evidence is conditional. The proposed admonition is thus virtu-
ally tautological. While tautologies cannot be "wrong," they are 
rarely useful in a codification. A couple of examples will illustrate 
the problems. 
Returning to my example of Hector's warning shout to 
Penelope, the upshot of the criticism of conditional relevance is that 
the court should not consider it appropriate, in ruling on admissibil-
ity, to make a determination about the truth or falsity of the follow-
ing proposition: 
P: Penelope heard Hector's shout. 
Friedman apparently intends to emphasize this point by the added 
language. If, however, the lawyer or judge applying the rule does 
not understand the modem conceptual criticism of the conditional 
relevance doctrine, Friedman's proposal will not prevent the error 
because the practitioner will likely reason as follows: 
The relevance of the evidence of Hector's shout is conditional on a 
finding that the shout was heard, in other words, a finding that P is 
40. Id. at 474. 
41. Id. 
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true because the shout means nothing unless it was heard. Therefore, 
there is a preliminary issue that determines the applicability of Rule 
402, the rule excluding irrelevant evidence. True, Friedman's revision 
of Rule 104(a) says that proposition P should not be deemed a pre-
liminary issue simply because the probative value of the shout is con-
ditional on the truth of P but that is not the reason I must or can 
invoke Rule 104(a); rather, I must or can invoke it because the rele-
vance of the shout is conditional. 
For those stuck in the traditional conceptual error, Friedman's pro-
posal is unlikely to be effectual.42 
On the other hand, even for those who accept the modem criti-
cism, his proposal is potentially confusing. This is so because, on 
those occasions when the relevance of evidence is truly conditional, 
it is also necessarily true that the probative value is conditional. 
The added language might, therefore, be construed as implying that 
no preliminary finding would be appropriate on the question of 
whether the predicate evidence has in fact been presented. Simi-
larly, for evidence of near-absolute conditional probative value, the 
language might be construed as implying that no preliminary :find-
ing would be appropriate as to the question of the presentation of 
the conditioning evidence.43 
For example, assuming that the proffered evidence of Hector's 
shout, considered alone, has near-absolute conditional probative 
value, consider the following proposition: 
P*: Other evidence has been introduced in the case showing that 
there is more than a de minimis probability that Penelope heard or 
otherwise became aware of Hector's shout.44 
42. In this regard, it is interesting to note that if practitioners understand the modem 
criticism of conditional relevance, they can virtually eliminate the possibility of perverse ex-
clusions of relevant evidence, even under the existing Rule 104(b), by recognizing that the 
only "condition of fact" upon which "the relevancy of evidence depends" is the existence of a 
nonzero probability for each conditioning proposition, that is each proposition knowledge of 
which affects the probative value of the proffered evidence in such a way that the evidence is 
logically relevant only if the probability of that fact being true is nonzero. See Nance, supra 
note 2, at 455-56. 
43. This, of course, is not logically precise in either case. The proposed language pre-
cludes a preliminary finding when the premise of such is the conditional character of the 
probative value of the proffered evidence, not when the premise is the conditional character 
of the relevance nor when the premise is the near-absolute conditional character of the pro· 
bative value. Relevance and probative value are not identical concepts even though rele-
vance entails the existence of probative value, and near-absolute conditional probative value, 
is not identical to conditional probative value even though the former entails the latter. But 
it is fair to question whether these subtleties will be appreciated in applying Friedman's pro-
posed language. 
. 44. For simplicity I have stated P* as a compound proposition, part of which is almost 
purely factual, that such other evidence has been introduced and, part of which is heavily 
judgmental, that the effect of the other evidence is to render the evidence of the shout signifi-
cantly probative. I am concerned here only with the factual part of the proposition. Note the 
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The probative value of the proffered evidence of Hector's shout is 
conditional on the truth of proposition P*, so the proposed lan-
guage might be understood as precluding the court from making a 
finding on the truth of P*. Yet this is exactly the kind of proposi-
tion the truth or falsity of which the trial court should determine 
under Rule 104(a).45 Indeed, much of the thrust of Friedman's 
comparatively subtle criticism of conditional relevance is that the 
courts should not confuse propositions like P with propositions like 
P*. 
Of course, one could try to reword Friedman's additional sen-
tence to obviate this difficulty. I suspect what Friedman had in 
mind by the word "proposition" was a proposition of adjudicative 
fact, a fact about the parties and their conduct, like P, not a propo-
sition about the state of the evidence, like P*. 46 But he does not 
attempt to limit the term in this way and, in fact, makes a point of 
describing the latter as "evidentiary propositions."47 The confusion 
is unnecessary. The point is simply that courts must be careful 
about which kinds of propositions they decide under Rule 104(a). 
That point can and should be made by way of explaining the elimi-
nation of Rule 104(b) in its current form. If this is done as part of 
the legislative history, there is no need to formulate language of 
accentuation to add to Rule 104(a). 
This is not to say that Rule 104(a) is otherwise a good provision. 
Actually, it is one of the worst in the Federal Rules.48 This is pri-
marily because it takes the very interesting and difficult set of issues 
associated with preliminary determinations and addresses only two. 
It tells us (1) that the trial judge makes the preliminary determina-
tion, and (2) that in doing so the judge may consider unprivileged 
evidence, even if it would be technically inadmissible. The first of 
parallel to my earlier Example #1. Similar propositions, the truth of which condition the 
probative value of proffered evidence, can be generated by using Example #2. 
45. In terms of a theory of inference, the beauty of these propositions about the presenta-
tion of evidence is that they will be known by the court as true or as false to a practical 
certainty. Thus, while the standard formally may be "preponderance of the evidence," the 
truth values of these propositions will be known more certainly than that suggests. 
46. This is evident from Friedman's discussion of the example following the suggested 
language. See Friedman, supra note 1, at 474 (discussing an application of that language to 
the Huddleston case). 
47. See id. at 456 (defining an "evidentiary" proposition as a proposition that evidence of 
a certain description has been introduced). To be precise, it is the purely factual part of P* 
that appears to be what Friedman means by an evidentiary proposition, see supra note 44, but 
the point remains the same. 
48. A preliminary critique is Ronald J. Allen, The Explanatory Value of Analyzing 
Codifications by Reference to Organizing Principles Other Than Those Employed in the Codi-
fication, 19 Nw. U. L. RE.v. 1080, 1084-89 (1985). 
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these prescriptions is apparently intended to preclude any role for 
the jury in administering the application of the exclusionary rules.49 
Most of the other interesting questions, like who bears the burden 
of persuasion and what standard of proof the judge should employ, 
were left to be resolved by the courts. 
Rule 104(a), however, does specify the evidence that the trial 
court may consider in ruling on preliminary issues. Unfortunately, 
this second prescription is not accurate, either as a description of 
what is done under the Rules or as a guide to what ought to be 
done. In any situation in which admissibility depends on weighing 
the probative value of the challenged evidence,50 probative value 
should be assessed by the trial judge in light of what the trier of fact 
may legitimately consider, which means in light of admissible evi-
dence.51 At least when the issue has been posed as one of condi-
tional relevance, the existing qualification of Rule 104(a), cross-
referencing Rule 104(b ), in effect negated the second sentence of 
Rule 104(a). If Rule 104(b) is replaced with some form of condi-
tional admissibility rule, then Rule 104(a) should be modified to 
reflect more accurately the limitation on the prescription of the sec-
ond sentence. Rule 104(a) would then read: 
{Nance's proposed amendment to} Rule 104(a). Questions of admissi-
bility generally. Preliminary questions concerning the qualifications 
of a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evi-
dence shall be determined by the court[, subject to the provisions of 
subdivision (b)]. In making its determination, it is not bound by the 
rules of evidence except those with respect to privilege, provided how-
ever that the court may consider only admissible evidence in assessing 
the probative value of challenged evidence for the purpose of applying 
any rule that depends upon such an assessment. 
Like Friedman's proposed addition, the goal of this amendment 
is to prevent lawyers and judges from doing something that they 
should be smart enough to avoid anyway.52 But unlike Friedman's 
proposal, this language is aimed at precluding an analysis that 
49. See generally McCORMICK, supra note 33, § 53. 
50. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403, 609(a), 609(b), 803(24), 804(b){5). 
51. Professor Friedman would surely agree with this point. See Friedman, supra note 1, at 
459 (emphasizing that a judge should evaluate probative value from the jury's point of view). 
52. For example, considering the effect of evidence that will not be before the jury in 
balancing probative value against potential prejudice or the risk of misleading the jury, as 
under Rule 403, would have to be recognized as unsound evidentiary policy though it is not 
logically inconsistent with other extant rules. The matter is somewhat Jess clear in the con-
text of balancing probative value against waste of time and resources because, in very unu-
sual contexts, this analysis might not advert only to wasting resources of the trier of fact. 
Rather than complicate matters by reference to this latter possibility, I have suggested a 
simpler rule. 
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otherwise could quite plausibly be viewed as mandated by the lan-
guage that it qualifies. Thus, in Example #3 of the previous Part, 
the trial judge might be called upon to rule on the admissibility of 
evidence of the defendant's wealth based, in part, on reliable but 
inadmissible hearsay evidence of the defendant's malicious conduct. 
Without the proposed qualification to Rule 104(a), the trial judge 
might be inclined - or induced - to reason as follows: 
A crucial part of the evidence of defendant's malice is inadmissible 
hearsay, yet, were it admissible, I think a prima fade case of malice 
would be established. Further, the second sentence of Rule 104(a) 
says that in making the determination of admissibility of the evidence 
of defendant's wealth, I am not bound by exclusionary rules other 
than those related to privileges. Thus, I must consider the hearsay 
evidence of malice and hold, for present purposes only, that a prima 
fade case of malice is established. Therefore, although I doubt the 
sense of it, I must hold the evidence of defendant's wealth admissible. 
The proposed qualification would preclude this reasoning, which 
otherwise arguably follows from the plain language of the existing 
rule.53 In my view, this danger, however serious, is one more ame-
nable to a codified solution. 
VI. THE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE REQUIREMENT 
Turning from the rules focused on preliminary issues to the 
"substantive" exclusionary rules, consider first the "personal knowl-
edge" requirement. As indicated above, the rule that a witness 
must testify to personal knowledge has been said to be based on the 
idea of conditional relevance. That explanation fails, once again, 
and we must seek a different understanding of the rule. The prefer-
ence for information that is within the personal knowledge of the 
witness serves several functions: (1) expanding the information 
available to the trier of fact beyond a conclusory statement of 
knowledge by the witness; (2) revealing the possible applicability of 
other exclusionary rules, especially the hearsay and original docu-
ment rules; and (3) affirming the empiricist rejection of knowledge 
based on intuition or mystical insight.54 
53. Of course, there is a way around this conclusion even under the existing rule. One 
could draw a distinction between the admissibility of the evidence before the judge in the 
preliminary issue hearing and the use that the judge makes of the evidence that is admitted 
for this purpose. The liberal admissibility rule stated in the current Rule 104(a) could then be 
said to apply only to the former issue. Unprivileged evidence that would not be admissible 
on the merits would then be admissible for the preliminary issue hearing, but it would not be 
considered in weighing the probative value of the evidence at issue against competing con-
cerns. The language I propose directs courts to draw just this distinction. 
54. See Friedman, supra note 1, at 474-75; Nance, supra note 2, at 488-90 & n.189. 
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Friedman, although recognizing the complexity of these issues, 
proposes only a "modest-seeming" revision of the applicable fed-
eral rule: 
{Friedman's proposed amendment to} Rule 602. Lack of personal 
knowledge. A [witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is 
introduced sufficient to support a finding] witness' testimony concern-
ing a matter shall be deemed to have probative value only to the extent 
that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to 
prove personal knowledge m,ay, but need not, consist of the witness' 
own testimony. This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 703, re-
lating to opinion testimony by expert witnesses.SS 
The goal of this revision is two-fold. Frrst, it eliminates the "suffi-
cient to support a finding" language that erroneously prescribes an 
intermediate finding of personal knowledge; any significant degree 
of probability of personal knowledge should be sufficient to allow 
admission of the testimony as far as this rule is concerned. Second, 
the revision removes from the trier of fact's consideration any inf or-
mation that is not derived from personal observation or perception, 
even if relevant.s6 
The "to the extent" language Friedman offers does not necessar-
ily accomplish the first purpose because a court might well consider 
it necessary to make a preliminary determination that the witness is 
testifying from personal knowledge. Indeed, the elimination of the 
"sufficient to support a finding" language might be construed as 
meaning that the court's determination of personal knowledge is to 
be made under the usual preponderance of the evidence standard, 
just the opposite of the intended effect. Friedman's retention of the 
language in the existing rule that authorizes the use of the witness's 
own testimony "to prove personal knowledge," as if personal 
knowledge is a fact that must be proved as a condition of admitting 
the testimony, encourages such a construction. This problem could 
be avoided by appropriate recourse to legislative history but per-
haps a different formulation of the rule would be better. 
Moreover, Friedman's goal of admitting testimony if there is 
any significant probability that it is based on personal knowledge 
arguably does not give enough weight to the other purposes of that 
requirement. His proposal is certainly consistent with the rejection 
of conditional relevance as an explanation of the personal knowl-
edge requirement as well as its substitution with near-absolute con-
ditional probative value. But the avoidance of nonempirical 
55. Friedman, supra note 1, at 475-76. 
56. See id. at 476. 
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sources of testimony and the appropriate regulation of hearsay evi-
dence call for a somewhat more demanding standard than Ftj.ed-
man prescribes, especially in regard to hearsay declarants' sources 
of information. 
It is also discomforting to have a rule that uses the phrase 
"deemed to have probative value." Like its use in Friedman's pro-
posed Rule 104(a), this language employs a fiction because testi-
mony not reporting matters from personal knowledge may well 
have significant probative value, as Friedman acknowledges.57 
Thus, a witness's testimony that the defendant killed the deceased, 
although based entirely on the victim's dying declaration to that ef-
fect, has significant probative value. But it should be excluded in 
preference for the witness's report of the dying declaration, which 
itself may or may not be admissible under the hearsay rule. It is 
better to have a rule that directly forces the report in the proper 
form, if that is possible, than a rule that indirectly forces this report 
by treating the witness's testimony as without probative value if the 
testimony is based on communication from others, especially when 
it is the jury that is being asked to apply such a fiction.58 
It should also be noted that the personal knowledge require-
ment proceeds from the premise that the preferred testimony is a 
witness reporting what she has directly observed with her own 
senses. In converting this preference into a personal knowledge 
rule, there are two distinguishable but analytically related problems 
.to keep in mind. First, there is the problem of uncertainty about 
which of several distinct possible sources is the source of the wit-
ness's claimed knowledge, assuming there is only one such source. 
The witness may claim to have observed the events when in reality 
she only knows what she was told about what happened. On the 
other hand, there is the problem of knowledge derived from multi-
ple sources and the attending uncertainty in attributing the knowl-
edge to the various sources. Suppose, for example, that an 
eyewitness to a shooting thinks he recognizes the shooter and sup-
pose that, after the shooter has fled the scene, the witness hears the 
declaration of the victim that confirms the witness's tentative con-
clusion that the shooter was the person who later is accused. The 
witness proposes to testify that he witnessed the shooting and that 
the accused committed the murder. Should this testimony be ad-
57. See id. at 474-75 n.69. 
58. When the issue arises, Professor Friedman clearly contemplates an instruction to the 
jury to treat as without probative value information that the witness provides from a source 
other than direct observation. See id. at 476. 
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missible? What if it is true that the dying declaration substantially 
affected his confidence in his perception of the shooter as the 
accused? 
In handling these problems, I suggest a different path to a some-
what more restrictive result: 
{Nance's proposed} Rule 602. Testimonial sources; personal knowl-
edge. Subject to the provisions of Article 7, concerning opinion 
evidence, 
(a) Witnesses. (1) Testimony is inadmissible unless the witness dis-
closes the source or sources of the witness's knowledge of the infor-
mation to be provided, except with regard to testimony about 
preliminary matters and other matters that are not reasonably dis-
putable. (2) Testimony must be limited in form to reports of the wit-
ness's sensory observations. 
(b) Hearsay declarants. (1) Hearsay evidence, as defined in Rule 
801( c ), is inadmissible if the declarant's putative knowledge of the de-
clared information is primarily attributable to sources other than per-
sonal sensory observation or communication from others. (2) If a 
hearsay declarant's putative knowledge of the declared information is 
more attributable to communication from others than to the declar-
ant's personal sensory observations, the hearsay declaration contain-
ing that information shall be treated as a report of such 
communication for purposes of applying the hearsay rule and section 
(b)(l) of this rule, even if it is not, in form, a report thereof. 
Like Friedman's proposal, my proposal calls for some explanation. 
Live testimony and hearsay declarations are treated differently be-
cause witnesses can be required to limit their testimony to direct 
observations, whereas hearsay declarations must be accepted or not 
in the manner that they were uttered.s9 
As to witnesses, the principal function of the personal knowl-
edge requirement, viewed from the vantage of the best evidence 
principle, is to expand the information the witness provides. This 
expansionary best evidence rule induces the proponent of the testi-
mony to elicit, up front, information that is peculiarly available to 
the witness and especially helpful to the tribunal if contemporane-
ously presented, namely, the source or sources of the witness's as-
serted knowledge. The disclosure that section (a)(l) thus mandates 
will reveal information about one or more of several possible 
sources: personal observation of the events declared, including 
statements made by others; communication from others not identi-
59. Professor Friedman does not address the problem of hearsay declarants in his pro-
posed rule, though he does mention in a footnote a difference in how they should be treated. 
See id. at 475 n.71. 
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fied as such; clairvoyance or mystical inspiration; and so forth.6° 
Such revelation in turn serves to facilitate the application of other 
exclusionary rules, in particular, the exclusionary rule contained in 
section (a)(2). This section obviously serves as the prohibition to 
which Rules 701 and 702, concerning permissible opinion testi-
mony, are exceptional.61 The words "in form" in section (a)(2) are 
intended to dispel any remaining inference that the trial court must 
make a finding under this rule about whether the witness in fact 
observed the events reported.62 
For example, if the revealed source is mystical intuition or an 
asserted personal observation under undeniably impossible condi-
tions, the testimony should be excluded as irrelevant under Rule 
402 or a waste of time under Rule 403. If the source is claimed to 
be personal observation, but the evidence indicates this to be im-
probable, though not impossible, the court will have to determine 
whether the probative value of the testimony is great enough not to 
be a waste of time under Rule 403. But ordinarily, if the witness 
plausibly reveals a direct observation of events and reports the 
events assertedly observed, the testimony should be admitted, as 
generally happens under current practice.63 Finally, if the testi-
mony reports a communication from others, the court will need to 
determine whether the hearsay rule applies and, in appropriate 
cases; ·whether the expert witness provisions are satisfied. 
Similarly, if the witness acknowledges or if the trial court be-
lieves based on other evidence that the witness's knowledge derives 
from multiple sources, the court should use Rule 403 in deciding 
whether to go forward with the testimony. Ordinarily, any substan-
tial claim of a mystical or clairvoyant source is so self-impeaching as 
60. Cf. DAVID A. SCHUM, THE EVIDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABILISTIC REASON-
ING 94-95 {1994) (articulating the three rational sources of testimony as (1) direct observa-
tion, (2) hearsay, and (3) inferences from the first two). 
61. See FED. R. EVID. 701 (authorizing the admission of certain lay opinions); FED. R. 
EVID. 702 (authorizing the admission of certain expert opinions). That, however, does not 
make Rule 602{a)(2) merely redundant with those sections. For example, Rule 701 does not 
prohibit testimony of a lay witness that, "while I was meditating on my mantra, it came to me 
in a flash that X committed the murder." This testimony is no more in the form of an opinion 
or inference than that of the usual eyewitness, so presumably it does not bring into operation 
the strictures of Rule 701. But as a report of extrasensory perception, it would violate section 
(a)(2) of the version of Rule 602 proposed here. 
62. Because the application of section (a)(2) will ordinarily presuppose the disclosure of 
testimonial sources, it is arguably redundant to make the disclosure a distinct requirement. 
Since the disclosure could indicate situations of multiple sources, however, it may aid both 
the court and the trier of fact in handling testimony that complies with this section. 
63. This reason is the principal one for the sentence in the current rule, as well as Fried-
man's proposal, that allows the court to use the witness's own testimony in making judgments 
about personal knowledge. This clarification is unnecessary under my proposal. 
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to render the testimony a waste of time. If, however, the revealed 
multiple sources are a mixture of substantial components of direct 
observation and communication from others, as in our example of 
the eyewitness to the shooting and subsequent declaration, then the 
court should simply instruct the witness to testify as best as possible 
solely about the direct observation and admit the testimony, leaving 
out reference to the communication unless it complies with the 
hearsay and other applicable rules. Unlike Friedman's proposal, as 
I understand it, the jury would not be instructed to discount the 
testimony to reflect the degree to which or probability that the wit-
ness's knowledge is based on inadmissible hearsay. Of course, the 
jury would be free to discount the weight of the testimony if the 
opponent chooses to explore the issue by way of impeachment. 
With regard to hearsay declarants, addressed in section (b) of 
the proposal, we are of course assuming that the hearsay falls within 
some exception or exclusion to the hearsay rule. In this context, 
one cannot employ the same strategy used for witnesses, namely, 
requiring the declarant's statement to be in the form of a report of 
direct observations. If not already in that form, the declarant has 
no opportunity to rephrase the declaration.64 Even with the assist-
ance of testimony from the declarant, it may not be possible to seg-
regate the parts or aspects of the declaration that are based on 
direct observation from those based on other sources. Some practi-
cal compromise is inevitable.65 One must rely upon regrettably 
gross probabilistic judgments as to the source or sources of the 
knowledge contained in the declaration. Although one can quibble 
over the precise formula for this purpose, no other approach is co-
herent with both the strong preference for limiting evidence to mat-
ters of personal knowledge and the prevailing practice in ruling on 
the admissibility of evidence claimed to be hearsay not within an 
exception. 66 
64. For the same reason, the lay opinion rule should not be applied to a hearsay declara-
tion. See McCORMICK, supra note 33, § 18. Note that the proposed rule does not exclude 
hearsay that states an inference from the permissible sources of direct observation or com-
munication from others. Such inferences may or may not be allowed under the rules in Arti-
cle 7 (on opinion evidence) or Article 8 (on hearsay evidence). Irrational inferences can also 
be excluded under Rule 402 or 403. 
65. Cf. id. § 10, at 17 (noting the necessity of practical comproinise in contexts of multiple 
sources for the live testimony of a witness). 
66. We do not, for example, adinit a hearsay statement when there is a small probability 
that it comes within a hearsay exception; we do not simply leave it to the trier of fact to 
discount the hearsay to the extent of the probability that it does not come within an excep-
tion. See generally GRAHAM c. LILLY, AN INI'RODUCI10N TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE§ 10.4 
(2d ed. 1987). 
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In a single source case in which there is doubt about the identity 
of the source, the terms "primarily attributable" in section (b )(1) 
and "more attributable" in section (b )(2) refer simply to a compari-
son of source probabilities. For example, if the court finds it more 
likely than not that the source is the declarant's personal observa-
tion of the events declared, then the rule poses no barrier to admis-
sion.67 If, however, the court finds that the declarant probably had 
no meaningful opportunity to observe either the events or at least a 
communication from another about the events, then the declaration 
should be excluded as concocted or imagined, as specified in section 
(b )(1) of the rule. If the court finds it more likely than not that the 
single source is communication from another, section (b )(1) is satis-
fied as to this declarant, but it must be separately applied to the 
other person or persons from whom the communication came. Sec-
tion (b )(2) assures this result; thus, it covers the situation in which, 
for example, the hearsay declaration is, "John killed her," but the 
evidence indicates that the declaration was based solely on the 
statement of yet another person. Functionally, the declaration is 
itself hearsay; that is, the testimony is "double hearsay," and it 
should be excluded unless the personal knowledge rule is satisfied 
as to the second-order declarant, and a second-level hearsay excep-
tion applies.68 Summarized succinctly, section (b)(l) calls for a 
probabilistic comparison of the two types of permissible sources 
with all other impermissible sources; section (b )(2) calls for a prob-
abilistic comparison between the two types of permissible sources· 
for hearsay declarations.69 
67. This includes a situation in which the declaration is that someone else told the declar-
ant something. Again, the references in the rule to the source being "a communication from 
others" is only activated if the declarant reports the content of that communication without 
identifying it as communicated information. 
68. Cf. McCORMICK, supra note 33, § 10, at 16 (explaining that in the context of a witness 
testifying to events rather than the communication that is the source of the witness's knowl-
edge, the testimony should be excluded under the personal knowledge rule rather than the 
hearsay rule); § 247, at 429 (elaborating on the point and noting that "when it appears, either 
from the phrasing of his testimony or from other sources, that the witness is testifying on the 
basis of reports from others, though he does not in terms testify to their statements, the 
distinction loses much of its significance, and courts may simply apply the label 'hearsay' "). 
In the context of a hearsay declarant, however, one must look to the substance rather than 
the form because the declarant cannot correct the form. 
69. For a more complex example than those provided in the text, imagine a single-source 
case in which the trial court assigns probabilities as follows: 
Probability (declarant reporting direct observation)=.3 
Probability (declarant reporting an unstated communication)=.4 
Probability (declarant imagining or fabricating the inforrnation)=.3 
In such a situation section (b)(l) does not exclude the testimony because the last probability 
is less than the sum of the first two; however, because the second probability is greater than 
the first, section (b)(2) prescribes that the testimony be handled as double hearsay, assuming, 
of course, that it would be double hearsay if the declarant had stated it as a communication 
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In the relatively unusual case in which there are serious pos-
sibilities of multiple sources, the terms "primarily attributable" and 
"more attributable" indicate a more complex weighing of the im-
portance of tQ.e various sources in applying the two rules of section 
(b). Note that if it is more likely than not that the source is some 
combination of personal observation of the events declared and un-
stated communication from another about such events, then section 
(b)(l) of the rule is satisfied as to the first-order hearsay declarant; 
this amounts to a finding that the declarant's statement was proba-
bly not concocted or imagined. A similar finding under this section, 
however, must be made as to the second-order hearsay declarant if 
a finding is made under section (b )(2) that the primary permissible 
source of the first-order hearsay declarant's knowledge was the 
communication from the second-order declarant. On the other 
hand, even if the more likely explanation of the first-order declara-
tion is that it is more a fabrication than a report of direct or indirect 
observations or inferences therefrom, the declaration may still qual-
ify for admission under this rule because the more likely explana-
tion could be a scenario partly based on direct or indirect 
observation.70 
Together, these applications of Rules 402, 403, and 602, as pro-
posed, accomplish everything that it is important to achieve through 
a personal knowledge requirement. One final point should be 
noted, however. While I have not included it in the foregoing lan-
guage, one might want to exempt admissions of a party opponent 
from the demands of the personal knowledge rule.71 Although 
there is much authority to the effect that personal knowledge is not 
from another. In addition to demanding a second-order hearsay exception, this means that 
section (b)(l) must be applied to the communication of the second-order declarant. 
70. Imagine, for example, that the trial court determines that there are only two signifi-
cant possibilities: either (A) the declarant directly observed the declared events, or (B) the 
declarant derived 45% of his confidence in the declaration from direct observation and 55% 
of his confidence from a vision that came during hypnosis. To be more concrete, suppose 
that another witness testifies that the declarant reported the hypnotic experience to her, but 
the declarant denies it in court. Then suppose the court assigns the probabilities of these two 
explanations as follows: 
Probability (A)=.4 
Probability (B)=.6 
In such a case, the testimony is not excluded under proposed section (b)(l) even though it is 
more likely than not that the declaration was based primarily on the hypnotic vision because 
it is also true that .4 + (.6)(.45)=67% of the declaration's significance is attributable to the 
declarant's direct observations. To anticipate the howls of protest, I do not mean to suggest 
that such a precise calculation will ever actually be made by the court; the numerical example 
is intended only heuristically, and the practical judgment will undoubtedly be made in a more 
impressionistic manner. 
71. To accomplish such an exclusion, for example, one could simply substitute "Rules 
801(c) and 801(d)(2)" for "Rule 801(c)" in section (b) of the proposed rule. 
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required for admissions, I doubt the wisdom of such a rule, espe-
cially in the context of vicarious admissions.72 Even as to personal 
admissions, the proposal would exclude only those the court consid-
ers probably not based primarily on either direct observatiOn or 
communications from others, which hardly seems too restrictive. 
The inclination to dispense with the personal knowledge require-
ment in these contexts is grounded in the assumption that the party-
declarant or the party's agent-declarant will have exercised caution 
in ascertaining the accuracy of important and usually damaging in-
formation. The mere making of such a statement should generally 
be enough to warrant the conclusion that the declarant's knowledge 
was probably not concocted out of thin air, and that is all section 
(b )(1) requires. The adversely affected party remains free, of 
course, to challenge the source of the declarant's knowledge, both 
in the judge's determination of admissibility and in the trier of fact's 
ultimate determinations. 
VII. THE AUTHENTICATION REQUIREMENT 
It is in the context of the authentication requirement that Pro-
fessor Friedman has taken the boldest step in terms of restructuring 
the Federal Rules. Here he explicitly endorses and formalizes the 
expansionary dimension of the best evidence principle, although he 
prefers to call it the "better" evidence principle.73 He suggests the 
following: 
{Friedman's proposed amendment to} Rule 901 (a). General provision. 
[Tue] There shall be no separate requirement of authentication or 
identification as a condition preced~nt to admissibility [is satisfied by 
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question] 
unless there is substantial doubt that the proffered evidence is what its 
proponent claims and the proponent of the evidence is substantially 
72. See McCoRMICK, supra note 33, § 255. 
73. See Friedman, supra note 1, at471 & n.66 (noting a suggestion by Peter Tiiiers). I had 
considered using the "better evidence" terminology in drafting my first article on the subject. 
Philosopher Jim Nickel also preferred that terminology when he read my article some years 
ago. It is more accurate in the sense that a preference for evidence E2 over offered evidence 
E1 can rightly be enforceable even though E2 is not the best evidence. If we know it is not, 
however, then that supposes there exists some evidence E3 that is preferred to Ei. and, if that 
is so, we could also enforce a preference for E3• Moreover, the fact that piecemeal relative 
improvements in the evidence may be enforced should not obscure the fact that the point of 
doing so is, ultimately, to have the best evidence practicable under the circumstances. Of 
course, in the end, the nomenclature matters only to the extent that it avoids confusion about 
the ideas being expressed, and I think either terminology is acceptable. I chose the "best 
evidence" locution partly out of deference to early evidence thinkers who expressed it that 
way. See Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, supra note 11, at 244 n.83. 
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better able than the opponent to produce evidence bearing on that 
question. 74 
Once again, Professor Friedman has made a decisive step forward 
by eliminating the "sufficient to support a finding" language that 
produces such theoretical and occasionally practical mischief. 
There are, however, three problems that must be addressed. The 
first two are modest and technical; the third is more fundamental. 
Once we correct for the first two, we will be in a better position to 
address the third. 
To dispose of one technical problem, an important cost-
containment feature does not appear in the proposal. Suppose the 
amount in controversy is $5,000; the authenticity of the proponent's 
proffer is seriously disputed; the proponent can obtain further evi-
dence of authenticity at a cost of $100,000; and the opponent can 
obtain further evidence only at a cost of $500,000. Given the last 
two figures, the proponent is "substantially better able than the op-
ponent to produce evidence bearing on" the question.75 Yet, it 
seems wrongheaded as a policy to require the proponent to obtain 
and present the additional evidence at such an extravagant cost or 
else forego the proffer in question, unless of course the proponent 
set up the situation, for example, by destroying other evidence that 
might have helped resolve the issue of authenticity at a much lower 
cost. Perhaps Professor Friedman's thinking is that such cases are 
unlikely to arise because the costs of obtaining additional evidence 
of authenticity will never be. so out of line with the amount in con-
troversy, but I see no reason to assume that to be so. A correction 
of this sort would seem to be entirely consistent with the spirit of 
his proposal.76 
The other technical problem has to do with the structure of the 
rules as a whole. Because the starting point in the analytical struc-
ture of the rules is that all relevant evidence is admissible, all other 
admissibility rules should be articulated as exclusionary rules or as 
qualifications of otherwise specified exclusionary rules.77 As the 
74. See Friedman, supra note 1, at 477. 
75. One could try to stretch the meaning of "substantially" in Friedman's proposal by 
saying that a degree of difference, no matter how large, is insubstantial unless it is enough to 
make the presentation by the proponent practical. But it would be better to make the point 
explicit. 
76. Indeed, inclusion of a cost-containment limitation renders the "substantial doubt" 
language in Friedman's proposal superfluous because the cost of extrinsic evidence of au-
thenticity cannot be worth incurring if there is no substantial doubt about authenticity. Thus, 
the cost-containment limitation can be seen as a generalization of the "no substantial doubt" 
exception. 
77. To be sure, some extant rules fail this standard, and they present serious interpreta-
tional problems. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 406 (prescribing that evidence of habit "is rele-
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law now stands, Rule 901(a) does not state an exclusionary rule; it 
refers to, without defining, a "requirement of authentication or 
identification" and then states how the exclusionary consequence of 
such a requirement is to be avoided by the proponent. Given the 
drafters' belief that these requirements simply apply the notion of 
conditional relevance, Rule 402 must be the exclusionary rule un-
derlying Rule 901; Rule 104(b) must be the method for handling the 
associated preliminary questions; and Rule 901(a) merely restates 
these points. But once this explanation of the rule is undermined, 
and one must look for a different theory of authentication 'and iden-
tification, one cannot rely on the implicit cross-reference to Rule 
402.78 Either the cross-reference should be changed to Rule 403, 
the more likely conceptual cousin, or the requirement must be 
stated as a distinct exclusionary rule specifying the circumstances in 
which it applies.79 
Friedman's proposal addresses this problem. He tells us that no 
such requirement is to be imposed unless certain conditions are 
present. His proposal attempts to make the rule more self-
sufficient. Unfortunately, as a matter of logic, it does not tell us 
whether such a requirement is to be imposed if those conditions are 
present.so More importantly, it does not tell us what the content of 
the requirement is if the conditions that invoke it are satisfied. 
Both difficulties seem to be unintended, so I will now restate Fried-
man's proposal so as to correct these points as well as the cost-
containment feature mentioned above: 
{Modified version of Friedman's proposal for} Rule 901 (a). General 
provision. Except as otherwise specifically provided, in order to in-
vant"); FED. R. Evm. 609(a) (prescribing that certain evidence of the commission of a crime 
"shall be admitted" for impeachment purposes). 
78. See Nance, supra note 2, at 484-85. 
79. If Rule 403 is the exclusionary authority upon which the authentication requirement 
depends, then the imposition of such a requirement presupposes a determination that the 
probative value of the unauthenticated thing is "substantialJ.y outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of un-
due delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. Evm. 
403. Only upon such a finding by the trial court would the authentication requirement be 
imposed, a requirement that could then be satisfied by evidence satisfying the standards spec-
ified in Article 9. The problems with such an analytical structure are, I take it, obvious. If 
the proffer is conditionally excluded for failure to meet the standard of Rule 403, why should 
it then be admitted upon introduction of evidence satisfying Rule 901? Why not gauge the 
effect of the additional foundation evidence directly in terms of the standard of Rule 403? 
80. Although one could quibble over the meaning of the word "unless," its most likely 
and ordinary meaning is "if not." Thus, the apparent form of his proposal is, "Not-
Requirement, if Not-Conditions." The contrapositive of this inference, which is its logical 
equivalent, is "If Requirement, then Conditions." But this rule is not the kind we need nor is 
it probably the kind Friedman intended. We need a rule in the converse form, "If Condi-
tions, then Requirement." 
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traduce an item of evidence, its proponent must introduce any admis-
sible extrinsic evidence, on the question of whether the proffered 
evidence is what the proponent claims, that the proponent is substan-
tially better able to produce than each opponent, unless without fault 
of the proponent the costs of providing and considering such evidence 
are unwarranted by the nature of the controversy and what such evi-
dence might contribute to its resolution. 
As restated, the third, more fundamental problem comes into 
clearer view. It will be observed that this provision is extremely 
wide ranging. It is not limited to any particular kind of evidence, 
tangible or testimonial, direct or circumstantial. In other words, it 
is a general better-evidence provision applicable in any situation in 
which there is substantial doubt that the proffered evidence "is 
what its proponent claims." The common law rule and the federal 
rule are not applied so broadly; they are largely limited to tangible, 
in other words nontestimonial evidence.s1 This raises a very diffi-
cult question. On the one hand, Friedman eschews a universally 
applicable expansionary best evidence rule, limiting his endorse-
ment of that idea to the authentication requirement. Yet his formu-
lation of that requirement does nothing to limit its applicability. 
How then are we to reconcile this apparent conflict? 
It is important to recognize that the "what the proponent 
claims" language appearing in both the current Rule 901(a) and 
Friedman's proposal does not serve effectively to limit the scope of 
the rule. To see why, consider the following: 
Example #5: Plaintiff offers a document that appears on its face to 
evidence a contract between plaintiff and defendant; it is signed in the 
name of the defendant. An objection is made that the document must 
be authenticated by a showing that it is in fact signed by the defend-
ant. Plaintiff responds that what she "claims this evidence to be" is a 
document purporting to be signed by someone with the same name as 
defendant. She asserts that if this claim is satisfactorily established, 
then the authentication requirement is satisfied, and the only remain-
ing issues would simply be the document's relevance and near-
absolute conditional probative value. 
Plaintiff's argument seems correct; yet if we accept it, it ends the 
authentication requirement as such. Under the present regime, this 
is of no great consequence because the plaintiff will only have sub-
stituted a conditional relevance problem for an authentication 
problem. The defendant can renew his objection by saying that the 
81. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 9.1 (1995). 
At least one exception appears to be recognized by FED. R. Evm. 901(b )(5) which implicitly 
asserts the applicability of the identification requirement to testimonial identifications of per-
sons by voice recognition. See also FED. R. Evm. 901(b)(6) (concerning telephonic conversa-
tions). I will indicate below why I think this exception is a mistake. 
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evidence is relevant only on a showing "sufficient to support a find-
ing" that defendant did in fact sign that document. Because the 
standard under the authentication rule is the same as that under 
conditional relevance, this ultimately leaves the plaintiff in the same 
position, at least if the defendant recognizes the fallback objection. 
But, once again, the conventional reasoning is defective,82 and, 
without the conditional relevance fallback, the malleability of the 
"what the proponent claims it to be" language poses serious diffi-
culty. For example, if one applies Friedman's proposed rule to Ex-
ample #5, there will be no substantial doubt that the document is 
what plaintiff claims it to be, and the "better.evidence" function will 
be thwarted even if the plaintiff has superior access to inexpensive 
evidence that will better show whether the defendant signed the 
document. This problem can be solved only by being less willing to 
allow the proponent to define what she "claims the evidence to be." 
Thus, one would have to say to the plaintiff in Example #5 that 
what she really claims the document to be is a contract signed by 
the defendant, not a contract purporting to be signed by someone 
with the defendant's name. Of course, one can imagine a state of 
the evidence in which that is not what she ultimately would claim 
the document to be, and such a demand on the plaintiff would force 
her to make at least a tentative commitment about the probative 
significance of the document. 
If we are to make this insistence on a specific probative connec-
tion with the ultimate material facts, however, then there will be 
difficulty precluding a more-than-trivial application of the authenti-
cation requirement to testimonial evidence. Consider: 
Example #6: Plaintiff offers the testimony of Wally that he was pres-
ent when defendant signed a writing evidencing a contract with plain-
tiff. Defendant objects that the testimony must be authenticated by 
evidence showing that Wally really was in the company of the defend-
ant, that it really was the defendant that Wally observed signing a 
contract, that what he really did was sign something as opposed to 
scratching himself with his pen, and so forth. Plaintiff replies that all 
she claims this evidence to be is the account of an eyewitness who 
asserts that these things are true, the rest of the issues simply going to 
the relevance or near-absolute conditional probative value of the 
testimony. 
The structure of the argument is the same as in Example #5, and 
there is no basis in the "what the proponent claims it to be" Ian-
82. The document is certainly relevant to the formation of the alleged contract even with-
out any further evidence that the defendant signed it, even though it may not be sufficient, 
without more, to satisfy the burden of proof. See Nance, supra note 2, at 457-59 (discussing a 
similar promissory note case). 
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guage for limiting the range of application of the authentication-
identification requirement to nontestimonial evidence, as has con-
ventionally been the practice. Moreover, if we prevent the propo-
nent from narrowing "what she claims the evidence to be" in 
respect to tangible items, as in Example #5, we must also do so in 
applying the authentication rule to testimonial evidence, as in Ex-
ample #6. Thus, its application to the latter example cannot be con-
fined to the trivial form argued by plaintiff. 
If conventional practice is right, both the current Rule 901(a) 
and Friedman's proposed version are, as stated, overinclusive by a 
wide margin. Friedman's proposal amounts to a universally appli-
cable better evidence rule, notwithstanding his stated desire to limit 
this rule to a special category of problems. It is not clear that he 
intends this breadth, but, if he does, an argument should be made 
either that conventional practice already contains such a rule, ap-
pearances notwithstanding, or that altering conventional practice in 
this regard would be beneficial. Perhaps such a case can be made. 
Although the matter is certainly debatable, there is at least good 
reason to follow the common law in imposing a special requirement 
applicable only to nontestimonial evidence. 
That reason arises from the obvious fact that nontestimonial evi-
dence, by definition, does not itself present a knowledgeable person 
that can be examined and cross-examined with regard to the con-
nection between the thing and the events that are the subject of the 
litigation. Authentication requires extrinsic evidence concerning 
the thing, extrinsic evidence that is either testimonial or nontesti-
monial, and, if it is the latter, then that nontestimonial thing will 
itself require authentication. In other words, at some point a spon-
soring witness must be provided as a source of information concern-
ing the nontestimonial things offered into evidence.83 While a 
nontestimonial thing cannot be said to be irrelevant for want of such 
sponsorship, it will generally be the case that the proponent will 
have access to a person who can provide important information by 
way of sponsorship and often the case that the presentation of the 
sponsoring witness by the proponent will be both more efficient and 
easier for the trier of fact to evaluate than a subsequent presenta-
tion of such a witness by the opponent.84 
83. Of course, as under current practice, there should be exceptions for situations of self-
authenticating things. See FED. R. Evm. 902 (specifying circumstances in which "[e]xtrinsic 
evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility is not required"). 
84. See Nance, supra note 2, at 485-86. 
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While a special authentication requirement is desirable, there 
has been much confusion in the common law and codifications 
about exactly how that requirement should be articulated, the most 
recent confusion arising from the Federal Rules' asserted depen-
dence on the concept of conditional relevance. I propose to retain 
the requirement in terms that will confine its application to nontes-
timonial evidence and free it from that dependence: 
{Nance's proposed} Rule 90l(a). Requirement of Authentication or 
Identification. Except as otherwise specifically provided in these rules 
or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statu-
tory authority or by Act of Congress, in order to introduce nontesti-
monial evidence, the proponent must present any admissible extrinsic 
evidence on the question of the thing's connection to the subject mat-
ter of the dispute that the proponent is substantially better able to 
produce than each opponent, unless without fault of the proponent 
the costs of producing and considering such extrinsic evidence are un-
warranted by the nature of the controversy and what such evidence 
might contribute to its resolution.ss 
Like Friedman's proposal, this rule would prescribe a "better 
evidence" authentication of nontestimonial things, insisting on ex-
trinsic evidence that can be used to evaluate the significance of the 
proffer. Like Friedman's proposal, this rule expresses an excusable 
better evidence preference: when the proponent has provided all 
that reasonably can be expected, the requirement is satisfied so that 
relevant tangible evidence is not lost simply because the proponent 
cannot prove it to be genuine by some inferentially arbitrary stan-
dard, like "a preponderance of the evidence" or "evidence suffi-
85. Under both Friedman's proposal and mine, Rule 90l(b}, which in the current rule 
provides a list of "illustrations" of how one can satisfy the requirement of Rule 901( a), would 
have to be substantially reworded or dropped entirely. In order to help resolve two points of 
inevitable contention, I further propose the following replacement for Rule 901(b): 
{Nance's proposed} Rule 901 (b). Witnesses identified with the proponent. In applying 
part {a) of this rule, the potential testimony of the proponent or of a witness who is 
closely identified with the proponent by virtue of current employment, family relation-
ship, or otherwise shall be considered evidence that the proponent is substantially better 
able to produce than an opponent. However, Rule 901(a) shall not be used to require 
the testimony of the accused in a criminal case. 
The effect of this additional component of proposed Rule 901 would be to prevent the propo-
nent from offering no sponsoring witness by arguing that the agents or relatives of the propo-
nent with authenticating information are equally available to the opponent. In almost no 
context, other than those involving self-authenticating documents and those in which the 
accused is the only potential witness, will the proponent be able to escape the responsibility 
of producing a sponsoring witness. On the other hand, even those persons closely identified 
with the proponent need not be produced if to do so would run afoul of the cost-containment 
limitation at the end of proposed Rule 901(a). The exclusion of the accused from the opera-
tion of Rule 901(a) is intended to avoid a conflict with the constitutional privilege against 
compelled testimony. See Nance, supra note 2, at 482-83. 
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cient to support a finding by a preponderance of the evidence. "86 
But unlike Friedman's proposal, it would use the language "to show 
the thing's connection to the subject matter of the dispute" in order 
to avoid the proponent's ability to control the requirement by alter-
ing her "claim" about the thing.87 It does not employ language that 
is readily extended to cover testimonial evidence.88 
This is not to say that there should be no "better evidence" rules 
applicable to testimonial evidence. In Part VI, for example, I dis-
cussed the personal knowledge requirement for witnesses, which, 
under my theory, is closely analogous to the authentication require-
ment for tangible things. Moreover, there are best evidence rules, 
such as the hearsay and original document rules, that apply to both 
testimony and documents. Finally, there is the possibility of apply-
ing the best evidence principle under the residual exclusionary dis-
cretion of the trial court.89 
As an example, it will be noted that my proposal eliminates the 
authentication or identification requirement, insofar as prescribed 
86. See Nance, supra note 2, at 492-97 (discussing the need for an excusable preference 
and the possibility, not always realized, of interpreting the existing federal rules so as to 
achieve such flexibility). Of course, the existence of exceptions for self-authenticating things, 
see supra note 83, will occasionally necessitate preliminary fact detenninations under the 
preponderance standard, as with exceptions to other exclusionary rules. 
f!>l. The "connection" language comes from Wigmore. See 7 JoHN HENRY WIOMORE, 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT CoMMON LAW§ 2129, at 704 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1978). While it is 
also subject to some degree of malleability, at least it is not articulated in such a way as to 
allow the proponent to control its meaning. 
88. Even as limited to nontestimonial evidence, one could argue that the proposed rule 
demands too much from the proponent in those cases in which, arguably, the proponent has 
access to more information than he provided. The standard of the proposed rule requires at 
least some potentially difficult judgments about the comparative access of the parties to the 
extrinsic evidence at issue. If it is viewed as simply too inconvenient for the trial courts to get 
into such issues as regularly as the proposed rule might require, then one could add a provi-
sion, possibly along the lines of the language of the current rule, that would place an upper 
limit on how much can be demanded of the proponent under this rule. 
89. In construing the discretion accorded trial judges under Rule 403 to exclude unduly 
prejudicial evidence, the drafters advised that "[t]he availability of other means of proof may 
... be an appropriate factor" to consider. FED. R. Evm. 403 advisory committee's note. 
Even if one takes a narrow construction of what the drafters meant by prejudice here, it is 
very likely that they intended for the same factor to be relevant in deciding whether to ex· 
elude evidence because of its potential to mislead the trier of fact. Moreover, the notion of 
"other means of proof" does not necessarily refer to evidence that is wholly distinct from 
that which the proponent has offered; it can also mean evidence that is more inclusive, in 
other words, further evidence that conditions the probative value of the proffered evidence. 
See, e.g., United States v. Crosby, 713 F.2d 1066, 1071-72 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.1001 
(1983) (affinning the exclusion of tangible evidence of allegedly prior consistent statements 
of a testifying defendant partly on grounds of their incompleteness). Consequently, it should 
also be legitimate in some cases to exclude testimonial evidence in order to induce its propo-
nent to present other evidence that conditions the probative value of the proffered testimony. 
See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 561 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (finding error in the admis· 
sion of testimony when additional information conditioning the probative value of the admit-
ted testimony was not also presented by the prosecution). 
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by Rule 901, that has been applied to testimony identifying a person 
with whom the witness has had a telephone conversation.9o Testi-
mony of the person who made or received the communication, who 
can be cross-examined as to its nature and content, should ordinar-
ily be an adequate compliance with the best evidence principle even 
if the witness is unable to identify the speaker on the basis of famili-
arity with his voice. Of course, in such a case the witness will be 
required to phrase the testimony in terms of a communication "with 
a speaker who identified himself as Smith," rather than a communi-
cation "with Smith"; that follows from the personal knowledge and 
opinion rules. Given testimony in such form, the dangers of false 
self-identification by the speaker are ordinarily no worse than many 
other unavoidable probative dangers, especially because the trier of 
fact is alerted to the danger by the very form of the testimony. 
Rarely in such cases does the proponent have superior access to 
additional evidence on the issue of the speaker's identity.91 On the 
other hand, an occasional case could arise where, for example, the 
proponent has access to a comparison specimen of the alleged 
speaker's voice that can readily be used to assist the witness in 
forming a helpful opinion about identity. In such a case, an applica-
tion of discretionary authority to exclude the testimony as mislead-
ing for want of use of the specimen may be in order under Rule 403. 
Moreover, in the absence of any such basis for comparison, the cir-
cumstances may show the testimony to be of too little probative 
value to warrant admission, and again, it may be excluded under 
Rule 403.92 
90. See FED. R. Evm. 901(b)(5), (6). See generally MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra 
note 81, §§ 9.12-.13. 
91. The use of admissibility language where sufficiency rulings are more appropriate is 
common in the cited cases. See, e.g., United States v. Pool, 660 F.2d 547, 560 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(reversing a conviction because DEA agent testified to receiving call from someone using 
same nickname as defendant; no other evidence confirmed that defendant in fact made the 
call, and the identification was essential to the conviction). More perversely, the 
authentication-identification requirement is sometimes applied in this context in order to 
facilitate the reversal of lower court factual findings "as a matter of law" by eliininating 
testimonial evidence the presence of which would Inilitate for deference to the trier of fact 
because of the importance of credibility. See, e.g., In re Dodd, 82 B.R. 924, 929 (N.D. Ill. 
1987) (ignoring testimonial evidence of a phone call from a creditor's employee in order to 
facilitate reversing bankruptcy court's finding that creditor had notice of subject matter of 
phone call). 
92. One Inight suspect a strategic ploy in response to the proposed rule. A proponent 
considering the introduction of a tangible thing into evidence, who does not want to provide 
the information the authentication rule demands, Inight offer instead a witness with liinited 
or no knowledge about the connection of the thing to the dispute, for the sole purpose of 
describing the thing. This testimony would not invoke an authentication requirement that is 
limited to nontestimonial evidence. It would, however, raise the applicability of the original 
document rule, if the thing in question is a document or other recording. See FED. R. Evm. 
1001, 1002. As for uninscribed tangible things, the original document rule does not apply, but 
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CONCLUSION 
When I wrote on conditional relevance in 1990, I was concerned 
with an exploration of the conceptual and policy underpinnings of 
the doctrine. I left for another day the question of how to draft 
provisions of an evidence code in order to reflect best the legitimate 
structure of thought found in the classic cases. Although it was not 
his primary purpose, Professor Friedman has done a great service 
by raising and addressing the codification issue, specifically in the 
context of the Federal Rules of Evidence. It is high time to take 
account of the criticism of the conditional relevance doctrine and 
the rules that are said to be based on it. There can be little doubt 
that the rules must be amended or else a very different explanation 
will have to be offered for them. This is true even if the present 
rules are considered relatively uncontroversial. Either mistakes are 
being made by following the existing rules, or lawyers and judges 
are - perhaps unknowingly - ignoring them in order to reach a 
better result than they prescribe. I suspect both things are happen-
ing. The new Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules, estab-
lished within the U.S. Judicial Conference, should at some point 
address these issues. I hope that what I have added here will help 
move that process yet further along. 
I also hope to have set to rest one misconception about the role 
of the best evidence principle in the analysis of these problems. As 
Professor Peter Tillers points out in his comment on Friedman's ar-
ticle, one dimension on which responses to the problems generated 
by situations of conditional probative value can be differentiated is 
the inclination to use relatively fixed rules to capture the balance of 
competing considerations versus the inclination to commit the bal-
ancing to the judgment of the trial court, usually pursuant to some 
sort of grant of discretionary authority.93 Obviously, the existing 
it remains within the court's discretion to exclude the secondary evidence under Rule 403 
when the thing is available for presentation. See generally Nance, The Best Evidence Princi-
ple, supra note 11, at 256-63. 
93. This idea seems to be one expressed in the following passage: 
One possible legal response - a response favored by Ball - is to have no specific legal 
rule to address the phenomenon of evidence whose relevance or probative value is con-
ditional. A second possible legal response is to have special, fixed ways of handling 
special categories of problems of conditional relevance and conditional probative value; 
Professor Dale Nance seems to Jean in this direction. A third possible response is to call 
for judges to make individualized, case-by-case determinations of the relevance and pro-
bative value of conditionally relevant evidence and conditionally probative evidence, 
respectively. Finally, there is a fourth possible legal response, at least theoretically 
speaking. The fourth option is to have a legal rule that directs trial judges to use a 
particular analytical procedure in cases in which the relevance or probative value of 
conditionally probative evidence is challenged. 
Tiilers, supra note 26, at 482-83 (footnotes omitted). 
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rules use both strategies in dealing with admissibility issues in gen-
eral.94 The question is how to deal with conditional probative value 
problems in particular. In terms of this criterion, both Professor 
Friedman and I, for the most part, favor the exercise of discretion. 
Ordinarily, in the Federal Rules scheme, this would mean discretion 
pursuant to Rule 403. Obvious exceptions for both of us are the 
requirements of personal knowledge and authentication, where we 
favor specific rules that directly or indirectly employ the expansion-
ary dimension of the best evidence principle. 
What this illustrates is that the employment of the best evidence 
principle and the breaking down of its use into contractionary and 
expansionary components do not presuppose any particular answer 
to the issue of rules versus discretion. Each component can beef-
fectuated by either type of response.95 The judgment about 
whether to employ relatively fixed rules or looser grants of discre-
tion is a judgment shaped by considerations of the context in which 
the trial courts make admissibility rulings, the frequency with which 
the particular issue recurs, the need of advocates for a degree of 
certainty in the planning of their cases, and the ability to capture 
the right balance in an appropriately worded rule. These considera-
tions, although practically very important, are largely extraneous to 
the theory of the best evidence principle that I have worked to elab-
orate. One can, for example, imagine an evidence code that con-
sists solely of Rules 401 through 403, where discretionary exclusion 
under Rule 403 would be largely informed by the best evidence 
principle. Thus, it is wrong to suppose, as some apparently have, 
that the emphasis on that principle calls for categorical rules.96 
94. Compare the discretion conferred by FED. R. Evro. 403 with the relatively fixed rules 
concerning hearsay, in Article 8; authentication, in Article 9; and documentary originals, in 
Article 10. 
95. The possibility of discretionary invocation of the best evidence principle is clearly 
articulated in my first article on that subject. See Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, supra 
note 11, at 256-63 (discussing rule-based and discretion-based applications). Indeed, it is a 
major part of the introductory discussion. Id. at 227-30 (criticizing the tendency to see the 
best evidence principle as underlying only the original document rule and arguing for the 
discretionary employment of that principle in situations that fall outside that or other rules). 
It recurs in the analysis of various doctrinal pockets illustrating the pressure toward discre-
tionary exclusion on best evidence grounds. See, e.g., id. at 256-63 (discussing cases that fall 
outside the scope of the original documents rule). 
96. For example, consider the following passage from a popular textbook addressing ad-
missibility problems generally: 
One of the larger questions raised by the Anglo-American system of evidence is who 
should be responsible for selecting the evidence to be presented to the trier of fact. The 
range of possible answers to this question is very broad. At one end of the spectrum, the 
rules could dictate very rigidly that certain types of evidence will not be accepted in lieu 
of other types of available "superior" evidence .... One could justify such a system with 
the argument that (1) reliability is the primary concern of the fact-finding process, (2) 
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Evidence law's movement over the past 100 years away from 
fixed rules or at least the appearance of fixed rules and toward 
more explicitly discretionary judgment is, I suspect, as unmistakable 
as it is generally desirable, but that by itself does not necessitate any 
change in the underlying principles by which the admission and 
evaluation of evidence are regulated. Indeed, if anything, under-
standing the traditional rules in terms of the best evidence principle 
allows one to see more clearly that the historical expansion of dis-
covery rights reduces the need for enforcement of evidentiary pref-
erences, whether by rules or by more discretionary judgments. In 
historical context, the best evidence approach has a generally corro-
sive effect on exclusionary practices. 
certain kinds of evidence (e.g., "real" evidence) are inherently more reliable than other 
kinds (e.g., testimonial evidence), and (3) the rules of evidence should specify eviden-
tiary choices so as to promote reliability. If one accepted all three parts of this argu-
ment, it might be possible to construct a detailed typology of kinds of evidence, from the 
most to the least favored variety, to apply to all situations. If nothing else, such a cata-
logue would provide an easily accessible guide to the advocate planning a litigation strat-
egy and to judges ruling on objections at trial. Indeed, Professor Dale Nance believes 
that the "best evidence principle" was the crucial organizing concept motivating the ra-
tionalistic common law judges during the formative era of Anglo-American 
jurisprudence. 
ERIC D. GREEN & CHARLES R. NESSON, PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 
978-79 (2d ed. 1994). Although the last sentence in this passage is essentially correct, its 
relationship to the preceding sentences is somewhat obscure. The passage mixes the issue of 
whether the inducement of parties to present superior evidence can and should be under-
taken with the issue of whether it should be undertaken by means of fixed rules applicable to 
specified categories of evidence. From the paragraph that follows in their text, one can infer 
that Professors Green and Nesson might say that a regime that enforced evidential prefer-
ences by ad hoc discretionary judgments would fall somewhere between the fixed-rules-of-
evidence hierarchy extreme and a completely laissez-faire approach in which preferences 
were entirely unenforced. See id. at 979-80. But associating the historical component of my 
work with the fixed-rules end of the spectrum, which itself is debatable, might erroneously 
suggest that, as a prescriptive matter, I generally or even consistently favor the use of rule-
based enforcement over the discretionary enforcement of preferences that these authors ac-
knowledge would be necessary within an otherwise largely unregulated evidence presenta-
tion process. Compare Professor Ttllers's characterization of my views, supra note 93. 
